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Abstract
We give a new construction of pseudorandom generators from any one-way function. The
construction achieves better parameters and is simpler than that given in the seminal work of
Hº astad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [SICOMP '99]. The key to our construction is a new
notion of next-block pseudoentropy, which is inspired by the notion of \inaccessible entropy"
recently introduced in [Haitner, Reingold, Vadhan, and Wee, STOC '09]. An additional ad-
vantage over previous constructions is that our pseudorandom generators are parallelizable and
invoke the one-way function in a non-adaptive manner. Using [Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushile-
vitz, SICOMP '06], this implies the existence of pseudorandom generators in NC
0 based on the
existence of one-way functions in NC
1.
Keywords: one-way function; pseudorandom generator; pseudoentropy
1 Introduction
The result of Hº astad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [14] that one-way functions imply pseudoran-
dom generators is one of the centerpieces of the foundations of cryptography and the theory of
pseudorandomness.
From the perspective of cryptography, it shows that a very powerful and useful cryptographic
primitive (namely, pseudorandom generators) can be constructed from the minimal assumption for
complexity-based cryptography (namely, one-way functions). With this starting point, numerous
other cryptographic primitives can also be constructed from one-way functions, such as private-
key cryptography [5, 21], bit-commitment schemes [22], zero-knowledge proofs for NP [6], and
identi¯cation schemes [3].
From the perspective of pseudorandomness, it provides strong evidence that pseudorandom bits
can be generated very e±ciently, with smaller computational resources than the \distinguishers" to
whom the bits should look random. Such kinds of pseudorandom generators are needed, for exam-
ple, for hardness results in learning [27] and the natural proofs barrier for circuit lower bounds [23].
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Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 89 (2010)Moreover, the paper of Hº astad et al. introduced concepts and techniques that now permeate the
theory of pseudorandomness, such as pseudoentropy and the Leftover Hash Lemma.
A drawback of the construction of Hº astad et al., however, is that it is quite complicated. While
it utilizes many elegant ideas and notions, the ¯nal construction combines these in a rather ad
hoc and indirect fashion due to various technical issues. In addition to being less satisfactory from
an aesthetic and pedagogical perspective, the complexity of the construction also has a signi¯cant
impact on its e±ciency. Indeed, it is too ine±cient to be implemented even for very modest settings
of parameters.
In the last few years, progress has been made on simplifying the construction of Hº astad et al. [16]
and improving its e±ciency [10]. These constructions, however, still retain the overall structure of
the Hº astad et al. construction, and thus retain some of the complex and ad hoc elements.
In this paper, we present a signi¯cantly more direct and e±cient construction of pseudorandom
generators from one-way functions. The key to our construction is a new notion of next-block
pseudoentropy, which is inspired by the recently introduced notion of \inaccessible entropy" [13].
1.1 The HILL Construction
Informally, a function f : f0;1gn ! f0;1gn is a one-way function (OWF) if it is easy to compute
(in polynomial time) and hard to invert even on random inputs. A polynomial-time computable
function G : f0;1gn ! f0;1gm(n) is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if it is stretching (i.e., m(n) >
n) and its output distribution is pseudorandom (i.e., G(Un) is computationally indistinguishable
from Um(n)). The theorem of Hº astad et al. relates these notions:
Theorem 1.1. If there exists a one-way function, then there exists a pseudorandom generator.
The key notion underlying their construction is the following generalization of pseudorandom-
ness.
De¯nition 1.2 (pseudoentropy, informal). A random variable X has pseudoentropy at least k if
there exists a random variable Y such that:
1. X is computationally indistinguishable from Y .
2. H(Y ) ¸ k, where H(¢) denotes Shannon entropy.1
A pseudoentropy generator (PEG)2 is a polynomial-time computable function G : f0;1gn !
f0;1gm(n) such that X = G(Un) has pseudoentropy at least H(G(Un)) + ¢(n) for some ¢(n) ¸
1=poly(n). We refer to ¢(n) as the entropy gap of G.
That every pseudorandom generator G : f0;1gn ! f0;1gm(n) is a pseudoentropy generator
can be seen by taking Y = Um(n) and noting that H(Y ) = m(n), but H(G(Un)) · H(Un) = n.
Pseudoentropy generators are weaker in that Y may be very far from uniform, and may even have
H(Y ) < n (as long as H(G(Un)) is even smaller).
The construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way functions proceeds roughly in the
following steps:
1The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is de¯ned to be E
xR ÃX
[log(1=Pr[X = x])].
2Hº astad et al. [14] refer to such a generator as a false entropy generator, and require that a pseudoentropy generator
to have output pseudoentropy (at least) n + ¢(n), rather than just H(G(Un)) + ¢(n). For the informal discussion
here, however, we prefer not to introduce the additional term \false entropy".
2OWF to PEG: Given a one-way function f : f0;1gn ! f0;1gn, Hº astad et al. de¯ne
PEG(x;h;i) = (f(x);h;h(x)1:::i), where h is an appropriate hash function and h(x)1:::i de-
notes the ¯rst i bits of h(x). PEG can be shown to be a pseudoentropy generator with an
entropy gap of roughly ¢ = logn=n | Whenever i = logjf¡1(x)j + £(logn) (which hap-
pens with probability £(logn=n)) the ¯rst ¼ logjf¡1(x)j bits of h(x) extract all the entropy
of x, and then we get £(logn) bits of pseudoentropy by the Goldreich{Levin Hardcore-Bit
Theorem [4].
Converting Shannon Entropy to Min-Entropy and Amplifying the Gap: Next, Hº astad
et al. use a direct product construction PEG0(x1;:::;xt) = (PEG(x1);:::;PEG(xt)) to con-
vert pseudoentropy into pseudo-min-entropy, and increase the entropy gap to be !(logn).
This turns out to require taking roughly t = (n=¢)2 copies.
Randomness Extraction: By hashing, Hº astad et al. extract pseudorandom bits from the
pseudo-min-entropy achieved so far. By also hashing the seed x to extract any remaining
entropy, they obtain a pseudorandom generator. Speci¯cally, they show that G(x;h1;h2) =
(h1;h2;h1(PEG0(x));h2(x)) is a pseudorandom generator, if the output lengths of h1 and h2
are chosen appropriately. The choice of output lengths depends on the amount of min-entropy
in the output of PEG0, which in turn depends on the amount of entropy in the output of PEG.
Unfortunately, these quantities may be infeasible to compute; this is handled by the next step.
Enumeration: Hº astad et al. enumerate over all u = O(n=¢) possible values k for the output
entropy of PEG (up to an accuracy of ¢=2), construct a pseudorandom generator Gk for
each, use composition to make each Gk stretch its seed by a factor of greater than u, and
then take G(x1;:::;xu) = G1(x1) © ¢¢¢ © Gu(xu) as their ¯nal pseudorandom generator.
The total seed length in this informal description is roughly n ¢ t ¢ u = O(n4=¢3) = O(n7). In
fact, we have been cheating a bit in order to present the construction in a more modular way
than in [14]. (The issues we ignored have to do with handling uniform adversaries, for which the
(non-)samplability of source Y in De¯nition 1.2 is an issue.) The actual seed length in the main
construction presented in [14] is of O(n10) (and the construction involves additional complications).
A construction of seed length O(n8) is outlined in [14], and has been formalized and proven in [16].
Above we see three main sources of ine±ciency in the construction: (1) the entropy gap ¢ being
fairly small, (2) the conversion of Shannon entropy to min-entropy, and (3) enumerating guesses
for the output entropy of the initial pseudoentropy generator. Haitner, Harnik, and Reingold [10]
show how to save a factor of n in the enumeration step (by constructing a pseudoentropy generator
in which more is known about how the entropy is distributed) to obtain a seed length of O(n7),
but still all of the steps remain.
A further complication in the construction of Hº astad et al. is that the reductions demonstrating
the correctness of the construction are much more complex for uniform adversaries. This aspect
of the proof has recently been simpli¯ed and made much more modular via Holenstein's uniform
hardcore lemma [15, 16].
In case the one-way function is secure against exponential running time (2­(n)) adversaries,
Holenstein [16] showed how to reduce the seed length to O(n4¢!(logn)) (or O(n5) to obtain a PRG
with exponential security), which was then improved by Haitner et al. [11] to O(n ¢ !(logn)) (or
O(n2) to obtain a PRG with exponential security).3
3In more detail, Holenstein's construction generalizes [14] for OWFs of \any hardness", while Haitner et al. [11]
31.2 Our Approach
Our construction is based on a generalization of the notion of a pseudoentropy generator. It is
motivated by the well-known fact that the pseudorandomness of a random variable X is equivalent
to each bit of X being indistinguishable from uniform given the previous ones [28]. That is,
X = (X1;:::;Xn) is computationally indistinguishable from Un = (Y1;:::;Yn) if and only if for
every i, (X1;X2;:::;Xi¡1;Xi) is computationally indistinguishable from (X1;X2;:::;Xi¡1;Yi). It
is thus natural to consider what happens if we require not that Xi be pseudorandom given the
previous bits, but only that Xi has pseudoentropy given the previous bits. More generally, we can
allow the Xi's to be blocks instead of bits.
De¯nition 1.3 (next-block pseudoentropy, informal). A random variable X = (X1;:::;Xm) has
next-block pseudoentropy at least k if there exists a set of random variables Y = fY1;:::;Ymg,
each jointly distributed with X, such that:
1. For every i, (X1;X2;:::;Xi¡1;Xi) is computationally indistinguishable from
(X1;X2;:::;Xi¡1;Yi).
2.
P
i H(YijX1;:::Xi¡1) ¸ k:
A next-block pseudoentropy generator (NBPEG) is a polynomial-time computable function G :
f0;1gn ! (f0;1g`)m such that (X1;:::;Xm) = G(Un) has next-block pseudoentropy at least
H(G(Un)) + ¢(n), where again ¢(n) is called the entropy gap.
That is, in total, the bits of X \look like" they have k bits of entropy given the previous ones.
Note that the case of 1 block (m = 1) amounts to the de¯nition of a pseudoentropy generator.
Also note that, when m > 1, allowing Y to be correlated with X in this de¯nition is essential: for
example if all the blocks of X are always equal to each other (and have noticeable entropy), then
there is no way to de¯ne Y that is independent of X and satis¯es the ¯rst condition.
With this notion, our construction proceeds as follows.
OWF to NBPEG: Given a one-way function f, we de¯ne G(x;h) =
(f(x);h;h(x)1;h(x)2;:::;h(x)n), where h : f0;1gn ! f0;1gn is an appropriate hash
function, and h(x)i is the i'th bit of h(x). Notice that this is the same as the construction
of Hº astad et al., except that we do not randomly truncate the output. At ¯rst, this seems
problematic; by revealing all of h(x), it becomes easy for an adversary to compute x, and
thus the pseudoentropy of output equals its real entropy (i.e., we have zero entropy gap). We
show, however, that it does indeed have next-block pseudoentropy at least n + logn, which is
even larger than the seed length of G. We have gained in two ways here. First, the entropy
gap is now ¢ = logn instead of ¢ = logn=n. Second, we know the total amount of entropy
in the output (though not the amount contributed by the individual blocks). These two
advantages improve the complexity and security of the rest of the construction. Furthermore,
the fact that the next-block pseudoentropy is larger than the seed length simpli¯es the
construction, as we do not need to extract any additional entropy from the seed.
Entropy Equalization: Here we use a technique from [13] to convert our knowledge about the
total entropy (summed over all blocks) into knowledge about the entropy in the individual
take a totally di®erent route (based on the\randomized iterate" of a function introduced by Goldreich et al. [7]) and
obtain constructions based on exponentially hard OWFs, as well as on (unknown-)regular OWFs.
4blocks. We evaluate G on u = O(n=¢) independent seeds and concatenate the outputs, but
randomly shifted by i
R Ã[n] coordinates. This increases our seed length and our entropy by a
multiplicatives factor of approximately u, but now almost all the blocks have pseudoentropy
at least the average pseudoentropy of the blocks of G.
Converting Shannon Entropy to Min-Entropy and Amplifying the Gap: This works the
same as in [14]. Again we take roughly t = O(n=¢)2 copies, but concatenate them within
each block to obtain an m-block generator G0. Now each of the m blocks is indistinguishable
from having high min-entropy conditioned on the previous ones. Thus, what we have is
computational analogue of a block source [2], which are random sources in which each block
has high min-entropy conditioned on the previous ones.
Randomness Extraction: For this step, we use a known method for block-source extraction [2,
29] and de¯ne G(x;h) = (h;h(G0(x)1);:::;h(G0(x)m)), where h is a universal hash function.
Since we know how much pseudo-min-entropy is in each block, there is no di±culty in choosing
the output length of h.
In total, our seed length is roughly O(n ¢ u ¢ t) = O(n4). For the case of exponentially hard
one-way functions, we can obtain ¢ = ­(n), and thus achieve seed O(n ¢ !(logn)) matching [11]
(but, unlike [11], our construction uses nonadaptive calls to the one-way function).
Note that our construction involves no \guessing" of entropies, neither in the construction of the
initial NBPEG G, nor in an enumeration step at the end. While the entropy equalization \costs"
the same (namely u = O(n=¢)) as enumeration did, it is actually doing more for us. Enumeration
handled our lack of knowledge of a single entropy value (for which there were only O(n=¢) choices),
but here equalization is handling lack of knowledge for approximately n entropy values (one for
each block), for which there are exponentially many choices. Moreover, enumeration required
composing the pseudorandom generators to increase their stretch, resulting in a construction that
is highly sequential and makes adaptive use of the one-way function. Our pseudorandom generators
make nonadaptive use of the one-way function and are parallelizable (e.g., in NC1), for getting
pseudorandom generators with small stretch. Using Applebaum et al. [1], this implies the existence
of pseudorandom generators in NC0 based on the existence of one-way functions in NC1.
1.3 Relation to Inaccessible Entropy
The notion of next-block pseudoentropy generators was inspired by the notion of inaccessible entropy
generators in [13]. These are generators G that also produce m blocks (x1;:::;xm) with the property
that it is infeasible for an adversary to generate a sequence of blocks (x1;:::;xm) that are consistent
with the output of G in such a way that entropy of the individual blocks xi is high (conditioned on
the state of the adversary after generating the previous blocks). Thus, in a computational sense, the
output of G has low entropy. For this reason, the notions of next-block pseudoentropy generators
and inaccessible entropy generators seem to be dual to each other.
The initial construction of an inaccessible entropy generator in [13] is G(x) =
(f(x)1;:::;f(x)n;x), which is very similar to our construction of a next-block pseudoentropy gen-
erator except that there is no hashing and the bits of f(x) instead of h(x) are treated as separate
blocks. This initial step is followed by entropy equalization and gap ampli¯cation steps that are
exactly the same as the one we use (but analyzed with respect to dual notions). The ¯nal hashing
5step there (to construct statistically hiding commitment schemes) is more complex than ours and
is necessarily interactive.
Interestingly, the notion of inaccessible entropy generator was introduced in an attempt to make
the construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes from one-way functions \as simple"
as the construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way functions, via manipulating notions
of computational entropy. (The previous construction, from [12], was extremely complex.) In
return, that e®ort has now inspired our simpli¯cations and improvements to the construction of
pseudorandom generators.
1.4 Paper Organization
Notations and de¯nitions used through this paper are given in Section 2, where the new notion of
a next-block pseudoentropy generator is formally de¯ned in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our
construction of next-block pseudoentropy generator from one-way functions, where in Section 5 we
show how to use next-block pseudoentropy generators to get a pseudorandom generator. Finally,
in Section 6 we use the above reductions to prove the main result of this paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Random Variables
Let X and Y be random variables taking values in a discrete universe U. We adopt the convention
that when the same random variable appears multiple times in an expression, all occurrences refer
to the same instantiation. For example, Pr[X = X] is 1. The support of a random variable X is
Supp(X) := fx : Pr[X = x] > 0g. We write ¢(X;Y ) to denote the statistical di®erence (a.k.a.
variation distance) between X and Y , i.e.
¢(X;Y ) = max
TµU
jPr[X 2 T] ¡ Pr[Y 2 T]j:
If ¢(X;Y ) · " (respectively, ¢(X;Y ) > "), we say that X and Y are "-close (resp., "-far).
2.2 Entropy Measures
We will refer to several measures of entropy in this work. The relation and motivation of these
measures is best understood by considering a notion that we will refer to as the sample-entropy:
For a random variable X and x 2 Supp(X), we de¯ne the sample-entropy of x with respect to X
to be the quantity
HX(x) := log(1=Pr[X = x]):
The sample-entropy measures the amount of \randomness" or \surprise" in the speci¯c sample x,
assuming that x has been generated according to X. Using this notion, we can de¯ne the Shannon
entropy H(X) and min-entropy H1(X) as follows:
H(X) := E
x
R ÃX
[HX(x)]
H1(X) := min
x2Supp(X)
HX(x)
6Flattening Shannon Entropy. It is well-known that the Shannon entropy of a random variable
can be converted to min-entropy (up to small statistical distance) by taking independent copies of
this variable.
Lemma 2.1. 1. Let X be a random variable taking values in a universe U, let t 2 N, and let
" > 0. Then with probability at least 1 ¡ " ¡ 2¡­(t) over x
R Ã Xt,
jHXt(x) ¡ t ¢ H(X)j · O(
p
t ¢ log(1=") ¢ log(jUj ¢ t)):
2. Let X;Y be jointly distributed random variables where X takes values in a universe U, let
t 2 N, and let " > 0. Then with probability at least 1 ¡ " ¡ 2¡­(t) over (x;y)
R Ã (Xt;Y t) :=
(X;Y )t, ¯
¯HXtjY t(xjy) ¡ t ¢ H(XjY )
¯
¯ · O(
p
t ¢ log(1=") ¢ log(jUj ¢ t)):
Proof. 1. For x = (x1;:::;xt), we have HXt(x) =
Pt
i=1 HX(xi). Thus, when x
R Ã Xt, HXt(x)
is the sum of t independent random variables HX(xi), and thus we can obtain concentration
around the expectation (which is t ¢ H(X)) via Cherno®-Hoe®ding Bounds. These random
variables HX(xi) are not bounded (as is required to apply the standard Cherno®{Hoe®ding
Bound), but they are unlikely to be much larger than O(logjUj). Speci¯cally, for every ¿ > 0
we have
Pr
xi
R ÃX
[HX(xi) ¸ log(jUj=¿)] ·
X
xi2U:HX(xi)¸log(jUj=¿)
Pr[X = xi]
· jUj ¢ 2¡log(jUj=¿)
= ¿:
A Cherno® Bound for random variables with such exponentially vanishing tails follows from
[26], and it says that the probability that the sum deviates from the expectation by at least
¢ ¢ (log(jUj=¿)) + 2¿t is at most exp(¡­(¢2=t)) + exp(¡­(¿t)), provided ¿ 2 [0;1]. An
appropriate choice of ¢ = O(
p
tlog(1=")) and ¿ = minf1;O(log(1=")=t)g completes the
proof.
2. Similar, noting that HXtjY t(xjy) =
Pt
i=1 HXjY (xijyi).
¤
2.3 One-way Functions
De¯nition 2.2. Let f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gm be a polynomial-time computable function, where n is a
security parameter and m = m(n). For T = T(n) and " = "(n), we say that f is a (T;")-one-way
function if for every probabilistic algorithm A running in time T and all su±ciently large n, we
have:
Pr[A(Y ) 2 f¡1(Y )] · ";
where the probability is taken over Y = f(Un) and the coin tosses of A. We say that f is a one-way
function if it is a (p(n);1=p(n))-one-way function for every polynomial p.
72.4 Pseudorandom Generators
De¯nition 2.3. Let X be a random variable, depending on a security parameter n, and taking
values in f0;1gm, for m = m(n). For T = T(n) and " = "(n), we say that X is (T;")-pseudorandom
if for every probabilistic distinguisher D running in time T and all su±ciently large n, we have:
jPr[D(X) = 1] ¡ Pr[D(Um) = 1]j · ":
A polynomial-time computable function G: f0;1gn 7! f0;1gm with m = m(n) > n is a (T;")-
pseudorandom generator if G(Un) is (T;")-pseudorandom.
We say that X is pseudorandom if it is (p(n);1=p(n))-pseudorandom for every polynomial p.
Similarly, G is a pseudorandom generator G if G(Un) is pseudorandom.
3 Next-block Pseudoentropy
In this section we formally de¯ne the new notion of next-block pseudoentropy, for the cases of both
Shannon entropy and min-entropy. The de¯nitions will di®er from the informal de¯nition given in
the introduction (De¯nition 1.3) in the following two ways, both of which are important for the
treatment of uniform adversaries:
² We will require indistinguishability even against algorithms that have an oracle for sampling
from the joint distribution (X;Yi). (This enables us to show, using a hybrid argument,
that pseudoentropy increases when we taking many independent copies of X. In the case of
nonuniform adversaries, no oracle for sampling from (X;Yi) is needed, as the samples can be
nonuniformly hardwired into the adversary.)
² In order to achieve the ¯rst item, we will allow the random variables Yi to depend on the
distinguisher.
Similar issues arise for treating uniform adversaries with standard pseudoentropy.
De¯nition 3.1. (next-block (Shannon) pseudoentropy) Let X be a random variable taking values
in Um, where X, U, and m may all depend on a security parameter n. For T = T(n), k = k(n)
and " = "(n), we say that X has (T;") next-block pseudoentropy at least k if for every oracle-aided
distinguisher D(¢) of running time at most T, there exists a set of random variables fY1;:::;Ymg
over U such that:
1.
Pm
i=1 H(Yi j X1;:::;Xi¡1) ¸ k, and
2. E
i
R Ã[m]
£
Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi) = 1] ¡ Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi¡1;Yi) = 1]
¤
· L ¢ ", where
OX;Y (i), for i 2 [m], samples according to the joint distribution (X;Yi), and L = L(n) is
a bound on number of calls made by D to OX;Y (including the challenge itself).
We say that X has next-block pseudoentropy at least k, if it has (p(n);1=p(n))-next-block pseu-
doentropy at least k for every polynomial p. We say that every block of X has (T;")-next-block
pseudoentropy at least ® = ®(n), if condition (1) above is replaced with H(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ® for
every i 2 [m].
8Note in comparing to the informal description given in the introduction, here we have omitted
absolute values in the indistinguishability condition (Condition 2) above (and below). This is purely
for technical convenience, as D can use O((m=")2) random samples from its oracle to test whether
the (signed) advantages inside the expectation are positive or negative to within an accuracy of
§"=2m and negate itself for some values of i in order to ensure a positive advantage of at least
L"=2.
De¯nition 3.2. (next-block pseudo-min-entropy) Let X be a random variable taking values in Um,
where X, U, and m may all depend on a security parameter n. For T = T(n), ® = ®(n), and
" = "(n), we say that every block of X has (T;")-next-block pseudo-min-entropy ®, if for every
oracle-aided distinguisher D(¢) running in time at most T(n), there exists a set of random variables
fY1;:::;Ymg over U such that:
1. H1(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ®, and
2. E
i
R Ã[m]
£
Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi) = 1] ¡ Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi¡1;Yi) = 1]
¤
· L ¢ ", where OX;Y
and L is as in De¯nition 3.1.
We say that every block of X has next-block pseudo-min-entropy ®, if every block of X has
(p(n);1=p(n))-next-block pseudo-min-entropy ®, for every polynomial p.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, in the following sections we view a distribution over f0;1gt
as a t-block distribution. When we refer to the next-block pseudoentropy properties of a function
G : f0;1gn ! f0;1gm, these refer to the random variable G(Un).
4 One-way Functions to Next-block Pseudoentropy Generator
This section will show how to construct a next-block pseudoentropy generator Gnb
f out of a one-way
function f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn.
Theorem 4.1. (Next-block pseudoentropy generator from one-way functions) Let n be a security
parameter and f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn be a polynomial-time computable function. Then there exists
a polynomial-time computable generator Gnb: f0;1gd 7! f0;1gm, with d = d(n) 2 O(n) and m =
m(n) 2 O(n), such that the following holds:
Security: Assume that f is a (T;") one-way function for some T = T(n) and " = "(n). Then for
any poly(n)-time computable value of "0 = "0(n) > 2¡n=4, Gnb has (T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0)-next-
block-pseudoentropy k = d + log(1=") ¡ O(logn).
Moreover, the reduction from the security of Gnb to that of f is fully black-box,4
Complexity: Gnb is computable in NC1 with one (uniformly random5) oracle call to f.
4That is, the proof of security treats both f and a possible adversary as black boxes (i.e., as oracles). See [24] for
more details.
5Here and similarly throughout the paper, we mean that when Gnb is evaluated on a uniformly random seed, its
oracle call to f is uniformly random.
9When f is a standard one-way function, we can take T = 1=" = nc0
for an arbitrarily large con-
stant c0 and set "0 = 1=n°c0
for a small universal constant °, to deduce that Gnb has (n­(c0);1=n­(c0))-
next-block pseudoentropy at least k = d + c0 logn ¡ O(logn). In particular, Gnb has next-block
pseudoentropy at least k = d + logn.
Our construction employs a family of hash functions Q = fQn = fq: f0;1gn 7! f0;1gngg. We
will shortly discuss the properties needed from Q. Given an appropriate family Q, we can de¯ne
Gnb
f quite easily:
Construction 4.2. On security parameter n, de¯ne the algorithm Gnb on domain f0;1gn £ Qn,
for Qn = fq: f0;1gn 7! f0;1gng, and oracle f : f0;1gn ! f0;1gn as follows:
Gnb
f(s;q) := (f(s);q;q(s)1;:::;q(s)n);
where s is n bits long and q(s)i denotes the ith bit of q(s). (Note that we abuse notation and write
q for both the function and its description.)
The following properties regarding the e±ciency of Gnb
f are immediate:
Lemma 4.3. If Q is in NC1 then Gnb
f is in NC1 with one oracle call to f. If the description
length of Qn is O(n) then the input length of Gnb
(¢) is linear in its ¯rst argument (as jqj = O(jsj).
Finally, Gnb
f invokes f exactly once (and thus is non-adaptive with respect to f). On a uniformly
random seed for Gnb, the single invocation of f is on a uniformly random input as well.
Indeed, we will de¯ne Q that is both e±cient and has a short description. The main require-
ment from Q, however, has to do with ensuring that Gnb
f is a next-block pseudoentropy generator.
Let us start by presenting the following strategy showing that the entropy gap (i.e., k ¡ d) is at
least logn when f is a standard one-way function. Let Df(y) := logjfx 2 f0;1gn: f(x) = ygj and
let S be uniformly distributed over f0;1gn. Then the distribution of S conditioned on y = f(S)
still has Df(y) bits of entropy. We would like Q to extract these bits and in addition to ex-
tract logn bits of pseudoentropy. More concretely, we ask that the ¯rst Df(y) + logn bits of
q(S) are pseudorandom even given y = f(S) and q (to simplify notation, we will ignore round-o®
errors and treat Df(y) as an integer). Given such a Q, we are essentially done (at least when
considering non-uniform security6). Consider the distributions X = Gnb
f(S;Q) and the distri-
bution (Y1;:::;Yn) := (f(S);Q;R1;:::Rk;Q(S)K+1;:::;Q(S)n), where S and Q are uniformly
distributed, K := Df(f(S)) + logn and the Ri's are uniformly random bits. By the above dis-
cussion, X and Y (more formally, X and fYig) are next-block indistinguishable. In addition, we
have:
m X
i=1
H(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ H(f(S)) + H(Q) + H(R1;:::;RKjf(S))
= H(f(S)) + H(Q) + E[Df(f(S)) + logn]
= n + logjQnj + logn:
and therefore Gnb
f is indeed a next-block pseudoentropy generator.
The ¯rst remaining challenge is to construct such a family Q. As we will discuss shortly, it is
easy to obtain all the above properties with hash functions that have description length n2. For
6I.e., the distinguisher is non-uniform and does not get oracle access to OX;Y .
10better e±ciency, we will settle on Q with slightly weaker properties (where the pseudorandom bits
extracted by q 2 Q will be pseudorandom up to advantage 1=n rather than an arbitrary inverse
polynomial advantage). An additional challenge is achieving next-block pseudoentropy in the (more
standard) uniform setting. The di±culty is that we need X and Y to be next-block indistinguishable
even given oracles that sample these distributions. While X is e±ciently samplable (and thus an
oracle that samples X is easy to implement), Y may not be (as Df(y) may be hard to compute).
To overcome this di±culty we employ Holenstein's Uniform Hardcore Lemma [15]. Employing
the Hardcore Lemma also closes the gap between the properties of Q we obtain and the stronger
properties in the discussion.
4.1 The family Q and unpredictability
A family Q with the above properties, but with description length n2, is easy to come by. Simply
de¯ne q(s) to be As, where A is a uniformly chosen n £ n matrix over GF(2). For a random
y = f(S), the Leftover Hash Lemma [20] yields that the ¯rst Df(y) ¡ clogn bits of Q(S) are
statistically close to uniform up to statistical distance 1=n­(c). An additional (c + 1) ¢ logn bits
are pseudorandom by reduction to the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate [4]. An interesting open
problem is to come up with a family Q that has similar properties and in addition has description
length n. Instead, in this paper we relax the requirements from Q.
De¯ning q(s) = As is equivalent to selecting each one of the output bits of q(s) to be a uniformly
selected location of the Hadamard encoding of s. If instead we let each bit be a location in
a polynomially-long encoding of s, we get description length nlogn. As long as this encoding
possesses good list-decoding properties, such a construction still su±ces for our purposes. To save
the ¯nal logn factor, we will look at an encoding of x into logarithmically long symbols (and
thus will only need n=logn symbols as the output of q(s)). The following lemma formalizes the
properties of the encoding we will use. As with the Hadamard Code, the code we will use will satisfy
both the role of extracting Df(y) ¡ O(logn) truly random bits via the Leftover Hash Lemma and
the role of extracting O(logn) pseudorandom bits similarly to a hardcore function.
Lemma 4.4. There exists an NC1 algorithm Enc such that on input s 2 f0;1gn, the algorithm
Enc produces t = poly(n) symbols Enc(s)1;Enc(s)2;:::;Enc(s)t with each Enc(s)i 2 f0;1g` for
` = dlogne and such that the following properties hold:
Almost 2-Universal: For every two distinct n-bit strings s 6= s0 it holds that
Pr
i2[t]
[Enc(s)i = Enc(s0)i] · 2¡` ¢ (1 + 1=(2n5)):
List Decoding: There exists a polynomial-time algorithm Dec that on input 1n and given oracle
access to a function ~ A : [t] £ f0;1g` ! f0;1g, outputs a list of poly(n) strings that includes
every s 2 f0;1gn satisfying the following:
Pr
i
R Ã[t]
[ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] ¡ Pr
i
R Ã[t];z
R Ãf0;1g`
[ ~ A(i;z) = 1]] > 1=5n2:
Note that the oracle ~ A has a domain of size t ¢ 2` = poly(n), so Dec has enough time to query
it on all inputs (i.e. \local decoding" is not needed).
11Proof Sketch. Enc can be taken to be the concatenation of the Reed-Solomon Code of degree
d = n ¡ 1 over F = GF(2c`) with the Hadamard Code over F0 = GF(2`), where ` = dlogne and
c 2 N is a su±ciently large constant to be determined below. That is, codewords are of length
t = jFj2 = poly(n), and for s = (s0;:::;sn¡1) 2 f0;1gn and (a;b) 2 F2, we set Enc(s)a;b =
(
P
i=0 siai)¯b 2 F0, where ¯ denotes dot product (viewing elements of F as c-dimensional vectors
over F0).
The almost-universality property follows from a standard argument: the probability that
Enc(s)a;b = Enc(s0)a;b is bounded by the probability that a random symbol of two distinct Reed-
Solomon codewords agree (which is at most d=jFj < n=nc) plus the probability that a random
symbol in two distinct Hadamard codewords agree (which is 1=jF0j = 1=2`). By taking c su±ciently
large (e.g. c ¸ 8), we get the desired property.
For the list-decoding property, given ~ A : [t] £ f0;1g` ! f0;1g that can distinguish a random
symbol of some (unknown) codeword Enc(s) from uniform with advantage greater than 1=5n2, we
will show how to obtain from ~ A a list k = poly(n) of \received words" r1;:::;rk 2 (f0;1g`)t such
Enc(s) agrees with one of the ri's in more than a ® = (1 + 1=5n2)=2` fraction of positions. By
applying the list-decoding algorithm of [8, Thm. 7] to each of the ri's, we are guaranteed to recover
each such s provided that
® ¸
1
jF0j
+
s
d
jFj
+ O
µ
1
t
¶
:
Since ® = 1=jF0j + ­(1=n3), and
p
d=jFj + O(1=t) = O(
p
1=nc¡1), the inequality is satis¯ed for a
su±ciently large choice of the constant c (e.g. c = 11).
We still need to show how to obtain the received words r1;:::;rk from ~ A. For this, we use the
standard transformation from distinguishers to predictors [28]. For each pair u;v 2 F0, we de¯ne
ru;v[i] =
(
u if ~ A(i;u) = 1
v otherwise:
Now consider any s such that
Pr
i
R Ã[t]
[ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] ¡ Pr
i
R Ã[t];z
R Ãf0;1g`
[ ~ A(i;z) = 1]] > 1=5n2:
Let's analyze the expected agreement between s and ru;v, when u and v are uniformly random
distinct elements of f0;1g`.
Pr
u;v;i
[ru;v[i] = Enc(s)i] = Pr
u;v;i
[u = Enc(s)i ^ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] + Pr
u;v;i
[v = Enc(s)i ^ ~ A(i;u) = 0]
=
1
2` ¢ Pr
i
[ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] +
1
2` ¢ Pr
i;u6=Enc(s)i
[ ~ A(i;u) = 0]
=
1
2` ¢
µ
Pr
i
[ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] + 1 ¡ Pr
i;u6=Enc(s)i
[ ~ A(i;u) = 1]
¶
>
1
2` ¢
µ
1 + Pr
i
[ ~ A(i;Enc(s)i) = 1] ¡ Pr
i;u
[ ~ A(i;u) = 1]
¶
>
1 + 1=5n2
2`
¤
12Construction 4.5. Let n, Enc, t and ` be as in Lemma 4.4. The description of a random hash
function q 2 Qn is composed of dn=`e random indices i1;:::;idn=`e 2 [t]. On input s de¯ne q(s) =
Enc(s)i1 :::Enc(s)idn=`e (which for simplicity will be assumed to be exactly n-bit long).
Lemma 4.6. Let n be a security parameter, Q be as in Construction 4.5, let Gnb be the oracle-
aided algorithm for Construction 4.2 (with respect to Q), and let f : f0;1gn ! f0;1gn be a (T;")
one-way function, for T = T(n) ¸ n;" = "(n). Then there exists a constant c > 0 such that
n¡1 X
i=0
Pr[P (f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)i) 6= Q(S)i+1] ¸
n ¡ H(f(S)) + log(1=") ¡ clogn
2
;
even when P is allowed to run in time T=nc, where S and Q are uniformly distributed over f0;1gn
and Qn respectively.
Note that above (and below) Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)i+1 refer to individual bits of Q(S), not `-bit
blocks.
Proof. Consider the following two distributions:
² X := (f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::Q(S)K) where K is the random variable Df(f(S)) + log(1=") ¡
c0 logn, and
² Y := (f(S);Q;R1;:::;RK), where R1;:::;RK are uniformly random and independent bits.
We will show that, for a su±ciently large choice of the constant c0, no algorithm with running
time T0 = T=nc0
can distinguish X from Y with advantage better than 1=n. The lemma then follows
by observing that the sum of the error probabilities in predicting the bits R1;:::;RK is at least
E[K]=2. In more detail, ¯rst note that K is always smaller than n, because if Df(t) ¸ n¡log(1=")
for some t, then Pr[Un 2 f¡1(t)] ¸ ", which gives rise to a trivial inversion algorithm that succeeds
with probability at least ". Thus,
n¡1 X
i=0
Pr[P (f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)i) 6= Q(S)i+1]
¸
n¡1 X
i=0
Pr[i < K ^ (P (f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)i) 6= Q(S)i+1)]
¸
n¡1 X
i=0
(Pr[i < K ^ (P (f(S);Q;R1;:::;Ri) 6= Ri+1)] ¡ 1=n)
¸
n¡1 X
i=0
(Pr[i < K]=2 ¡ 1=n)
= E[K]=2 ¡ 1
= (n ¡ H(f(S)) + log(1=") ¡ c0 logn ¡ 2)=2:
We will assume for simplicity that ` always divides both Df(t) and log(1="). Let A =
Df(f(S))=` and a0 = log(1=")=`. Recall that q(s) is de¯ned to be (Enc(s)i1 :::Enc(s)idn=`e). There-
fore, we need to prove that (Enc(S)I1 :::Enc(S)IA+a0¡c0) is 1=n-pseudorandom even given f(S) and
Q = (I1;:::;Idn=`e). To prove this, we introduce a hybrid distribution Z, de¯ned as follows:
13² Z := (f(S);Q;Enc(S)I1;:::;Enc(S)IA¡5ZA¡4 ¢¢¢ZA+a0¡c0), where Z1;:::;ZA+a0¡c0 are uni-
formly random and independent elements of f0;1g`.
First we argue that Z has statistical distance at most 1=10n2 from Y =
(f(S);Q;Z1;:::;ZA+a0¡c0). Let's condition on any ¯xed value f(S) = t. This also deter-
mines that A = Df(t)=` =: a. The distribution of S conditioned on f(S) = t still has min-entropy
Df(t) = a ¢ `. As Enc is almost universal (see ¯rst property in Lemma 4.4), for every two distinct
n-bit strings s 6= s0 we have that
Pr[Enc(s)I1 :::Enc(s)Ia¡5 = Enc(s0)I1 :::Enc(s0)Ia¡5] · 2¡(a¡5)` ¢ (1 + 1=100n4):
Therefore, the Leftover Hash Lemma [20, 19] yields that (conditioned on f(S) = t) the pre¯x
(Q;Enc(S)I1 :::Enc(S)IA¡5) is ±-close to uniform for ± = 1=2 ¢
p
2¡5` + 1=100n4 · 1=10n2.
Now we argue that there is no algorithm B that runs in time T0 and distinguishes X =
(f(S);Q;Enc(S)I1;:::;Enc(S)IA+a0¡c0) from Z with advantage better than 9=10n. Assume that
there is such an algorithm A. By an hybrid argument, we get that for a random index J between
A¡4 and A+a0¡c0 the algorithm B distinguishes with advantage at least 9=10n2 the distributions
HJ and HJ+1 where
² Hj = (f(S);Q;Enc(S)I1;:::;Enc(S)Ij¡1;Zj ¢¢¢ZA+a0¡c0).
Now, by a Markov argument, it holds that with probability at least 1=2n2 over ¯xing B's coin
tosses and all components of HJ and HJ+1 other than IJ, Enc(S)IJ, and ZJ, B distinguishes
(IJ;Enc(S)IJ) from (IJ;ZJ) with advantage at least 2=5n2. Thus, if we can generate those com-
ponents given a value of f(S), we can plug B into the decoder Dec guaranteed by Lemma 4.4 to
recover S and hence invert f. We will not generate the components exactly, but closely enough so
that the inversion will still succeed with nonnegligible probability.
The inverter gets as input t = f(S) and operates as follows:
1. Guess the value of a
R Ã [n=`].
2. Sample uniformly at random coin tosses for B.
3. Sample uniformly at random i1 :::ia¡5
R Ã [t]) and z1;:::zia¡5
R Ã f0;1g`.
4. Select at random j
R Ã fa ¡ 4;:::;a + a0 ¡ c0g.
5. Sample uniformly at random ia¡4;:::ij¡1;ij+1;:::ia+a0¡c0
R Ã [t] and
za¡4;:::zj¡1;zj+1;:::za+a0¡c0
R Ã f0;1g`.
6. We have ¯xed all of the inputs of B aside from ij and zij. Denote the resulting algorithm
after all of these ¯xings as ~ B.
7. Invoke Dec
~ B(1n), where Dec is as in Lemma 4.4.
8. Select at random an element in the list returned by Dec
~ B.
Let's examine how the distribution of B's inputs that are ¯xed by the inverter di®ers from that
in HJ and HJ+1:
14² The inverter chooses a uniformly at random. This value will be correct (i.e. equal to `¢Df(t))
with probability at least 1=n.
² The inverter chooses z1;:::zia¡5 uniformly at random, whereas in HJ these are distributed
according to (Enc(S)I1;:::;Enc(S)Ia¡5). However, by the indistinguishability of Z and Y ,
the latter distribution is (1=10n2)-close to uniform (given f(S) and Q). Thus, this will reduce
the probability of a good ¯xing by at most 1=10n2, from 1=2n2 to 2=5n2.
² The inverter chooses za¡4;:::zj¡1 uniformly at random whereas in HJ these are distributed
according to (Enc(S)IA¡4;:::;Enc(S)IJ¡1). However, this amounts to guessing at most u =
(a0 + 5 ¡ c0) ¢ ` bits, and hence will be correct with probability at least 2¡u ¸ " ¢ nc0
=n5.
In total, the list-decoding algorithm successfully recovers S (among a list of poly(n) possibilities)
with probability at least (1=n) ¢ (2=5n2) ¢ (" ¢ nc0
=n5) = " ¢ nc0
=poly(n). Choosing at random from
the list of decodings reduces the inversion probability by another factor of poly(n). Taking c0
su±ciently large, the inverter succeeds with probability at least ". We note that the inverter runs
in time poly(n) making at most 2` ¢ t = poly(n) queries to B. Thus if B runs in time T(n)=nc for
a su±ciently large constant c, the inverter runs in time at most T(n), contradicting the security of
f. ¤
4.2 Proving Next-block Pseudoentropy via Hardcore Lemma
Lemma 4.6 shows that the output of Gnb (after f(S) and Q) satis¯es a weak next-bit unpredictabil-
ity. In this section, we use Holenstein's uniform variant of Impagliazzo's Hardcore Lemma [18] to
translate this weak next-bit unpredictability into next-bit pseudoentropy, thereby proving Theo-
rem 4.9.
The Hardcore Lemma translates weak unpredictability (of a single bit) into strong unpredictabil-
ity on a noticeable fraction of inputs:
Proposition 4.7 ([17]). Let n be a security parameter, and let h: f0;1gn 7! f0;1g`(n) and
V : f0;1gn 7! f0;1g be polynomial-time computable functions. Let ±0 = ±0(n) 2 [0;1], ± = ±(n) 2
[±0;1], and ° = °(n) 2 [0;1] > 2¡n=3. Assume that
Pr[M(±0;°;h(Un)) = V (Un)] · 1 ¡ ±=2
for every probabilistic algorithm M running in time T = T(n) and large enough n. Then for every
oracle-aided predictor P running in time T ¢ (°±0=n)O(1) and all su±ciently large n, there exists a
set L µ f0;1gn of density at least ± such that
Pr
W
R ÃL
[PÂL(h(W)) = V (W)] < (1 + °)=2;
where ÂL is the characteristic function of L, provided that all the queries of P to ÂL are computed
independently of the input h(W). Furthermore, the reduction is fully black-box.
The above di®ers from Holenstein's Hardcore Lemma in that it does not require that ± be known
to M, but only requires a lower bound ±0 on ±. However, the above can be readily deduced from
Holenstein's version; see Appendix A.
We now reinterpret Holenstein's Hardcore Lemma in terms of conditional pseudoentropy, simi-
larly to the reinterpretation of Impagliazzo's Hardcore Lemma in [25].
15Proposition 4.8. Let n be a security parameter, ±0 = ±0(n) 2 [0;1], ± = ±(n) 2 [±0;1], and ° =
°(n) 2 [0;1] > 2¡n=3. Let (A;B) be a poly(n)-time samplable random variable over f0;1g`(n)£f0;1g
such that
Pr[M(±0;°;A) = B] · 1 ¡ ±=2
for every probabilistic algorithm M running in time T = T(n) and large enough n. Then for every
oracle-aided distinguisher D running in time T0 = T ¢(±0°=n)O(1) and all su±ciently large n, there
is a random variable C, jointly distributed with (A;B), such that:
1. H(CjA) ¸ ±.
2. Pr[DOA;B;C(A;B) = 1] ¡ Pr[DOA;B;C(A;C) = 1] · °,
where OA;B;C is an oracle that samples according to the joint distribution (A;B;C).
Proof. Let (h;V ) : f0;1gn ! f0;1g`(n) £ f0;1g be the poly-time sampling algorithms for (A;B),
i.e. (h(Un);V (Un)) = (A;B). (By renaming the security parameter n, we may assume that the
sampling algorithms use n coin tosses.) Thus we may apply Proposition 4.7 to the pair (h;V ). For
any given subset L µ f0;1gn of density ±, we de¯ne a probabilistic function VL : f0;1gn ! f0;1g,
where
VL(r) =
(
V (r) if r = 2 L
a random bit if r 2 L:
From this we get a random variable CL jointly distributed with (A;B), de¯ned by (A;CL) =
(h(Un);VL(Un)). Notice that H(CLjA) is at least the density of L, namely ±. We will show
that taking C = CL for some L su±ces. Suppose for contradiction that we have an oracle-aided
distinguisher D running in time T0 such that for every L of density ±, Pr[DOA;B;CL(A;B) = 1] ¡
Pr[DOA;B;CL(A;CL) = 1] > °. Since B and CL are identical when Un = 2 L, we have
Pr[DOA;B;CL(A;B) = 1jUn 2 L] ¡ Pr[DOA;B;CL(A;CL) = 1jUn 2 L] > °:
Since CL is a uniformly random bit when Un 2 L, we can apply the standard reduction from
distinguishing to predicting to obtain an oracle-aided predictor P, running in time T0 + O(1) such
that
Pr[PÂL(A) = BjUn 2 L] > (1 + °)=2: (1)
Speci¯cally, on input x, P generates a random bit b
R Ã f0;1g, runs DOA;B;CL(x;b), outputs b if D
outputs 1, and outputs :b if D outputs 0. P can simulate random samples from the oracle OA;B;CL
by choosing r
R Ãf0;1gn and outputting (h(r);V (r);VL(r)), which can be e±ciently computed using
P's oracle access to ÂL. Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Pr
W
R ÃL
[PÂL(h(W)) = V (W)] > (1 + °)=2:
This contradicts Proposition 4.7. ¤
We now use this form of the Hardcore Lemma to deduce Theorem 4.9 from Lemma 4.6.
Theorem 4.9 (Theorem 4.9, restated). Let n be a security parameter and f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn be
a polynomial-time computable function. Then there exists a polynomial-time computable generator
Gnb: f0;1gd 7! f0;1gm, with d = d(n) 2 O(n) and m = m(n) 2 O(n), such that the following
holds:
16Security: Assume that f is a (T;") one-way function for some T = T(n) and " = "(n). Then for
any poly(n)-time computable value of "0 = "0(n) > 2¡n=4, Gnb has (T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0)-next-
block-pseudoentropy k = d + log(1=") ¡ O(logn).
Moreover, the reduction from the security of Gnb to that of f is fully black-box,7
Complexity: Gnb is computable in NC1 with one (uniformly random8) oracle call to f.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.9) Let W = (Q;S) be uniformly distributed over the domain of Gnb (i.e.,
f0;1gn £Qn), let X = Gnb(W) and denote the length of X by m = m(n) = 2n+logjQnj. Assume
that the the theorem does not hold. In particular, there exists an oracle-aided algorithm D whose
running time is running time is bounded by T0 = T0(n) and the following holds for every set of
distributions fYigi2[m] over f0;1g, jointly distributed with X, with
Pm
i=1 H(Yi j X1;:::;Xi¡1) ¸
k = d + log(1=") ¡ c ¢ logn:
E
i
R Ã[m]
£
Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi) = 1] ¡ Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi¡1;Yi) = 1]
¤
¸ L ¢ "0 ¸ "0; (2)
where L is the number of oracle queries made by D and c is the constant of Lemma 4.6.
Recall that X = (f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)n). By Lemma 4.6, if we take A =
(f(S);Q;Q(S)1;:::;Q(S)I¡1) and B = Q(S)I, for I uniformly random over [n], we have
Pr[M("0;A) = B] · 1 ¡ ±=2; (3)
for
± =
n¡H(f(S))+log(1=")¡clogn
n
and any algorithm M running in time T=nc¡p(n) · T=2¢nc, where p 2 poly is the computing time
of "0, and for the inequality we assume without loss of generality that T > 2p(n)¢nc (otherwise the
conclusion of the theorem holds trivially). In the following we use Proposition 4.8 for showing that
Equation (3) is in contradiction to Equation (2).
Let C be any random variable, jointly distributed with A, such that H(CjA) ¸ ±. We can use
any such C to de¯ne a set fYig of random variables jointly distributed with X:
YijX=(x1;:::;xm) =
(
xi if i · n + logjQj
CjI=i;X=(x1;:::;xn) otherwise:
InoteCan CjI=i not be well de¯ned?
Then
m X
i=1
H(YijX1;:::;Xi¡1) =
n+logjQj X
i=1
H(XijX1;:::;Xi¡1) +
n X
i=1
H(CjA;I = i)
= H(f(S);Q) + n ¢ H(CjA)
¸ H(f(S)) + H(Q) + n ¡ H(f(S)) + log(1=") ¡ clogn
= d + log(1=") ¡ clogn = k;
7That is, the proof of security treats both f and a possible adversary as black boxes (i.e., as oracles). See [24] for
more details.
8Here and throughout the paper, when we say that Gnb makes a uniformly random call to f, we refer to the
distribution of the call when we run Gnb on a uniformly random seed.
17where d is the seed length of Gnb. Therefore Equation (2) holds, i.e. D is a next-block distinguisher
for X and fYig with advantage "0. Observe that D has zero advantage when i · n+logjQj (because
then Yi = Xi), and thus must gain its entire advantage when i > n + logjQj. In the latter case,
D is distinguishing (A;B) from (A;C) with advantage "0. Moreover, each of D's oracle queries to
OX;Y (i) can be simulated with O(n) queries to OA;B;C. (It may take an expected O(n) trials to
get a sample in which I has the desired value.) Thus, we obtain an algorithm D0 running in
time T0 = O(T0 ¢ n) such that D
OA;B;C
0 distinguishes (A;B) from (A;C) with advantage greater
that "0, for any C such that H(CjA) ¸ ±. Proposition 4.8 yields the existence of an algorithm M of
running time T0 ¢(n="0)O(1) such that Pr[M("0;A) = B] > 1¡±=2 for in¯nitely many n's. (We can
set ±0 = 1=n, since if ± < 1=n, the conclusion of the theorem holds trivially.) Setting the constant
in the de¯nition of T0 to large enough value (recall that T0 = T ¢("0=n)O(1)) yields that the running
time of M is bounded by T=2 ¢ nc, in contradiction to Equation (3). ¤
5 From Next-Block Pseudoentropy to Pseudorandom Generators
In this section we show how to transform a next-block pseudoentropy generator into a pseudorandom
generator.
Theorem 5.1. (Next-block pseudoentropy generator to pseudorandom generator) Let n be a security
parameter, and let m = m(n), ¢ = ¢(n) 2 [1=poly(n);n], and · = ·(n) 2 f1;:::;ng be poly(n)-
time computable. For every polynomial-time computable, m-block generator Gnb: f0;1gn 7! f0;1gm,
there exists a polynomial-time computable generator G : f0;1gd ! f0;1gd¢(1+­(¢=n)) with seed length
d = d(n) = O
µ
n2 ¢ m2 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
¢3
¶
such that the following holds:
Security: If Gnb has (T;")-next-block pseudoentropy at least n + ¢, for T = T(n);" = "(n), then
G is a (T ¡nO(1);nO(1) ¢("+2¡·))-pseudorandom generator. Moreover, the reduction is fully
black-box.
Complexity: G is computable in NC1 with O(d=n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to Gnb.
In Theorem 5.1, it may be convenient to view ·(n) as the security parameter of the construction.
In particular, when ·(n) logarithmic in 1="(n) we get that (T(n);"(n))-next-block pseudoentropy
turns into an (T(n)=poly(n);poly(n) ¢ "(n))-pseudorandom generator.
We prove Theorem 5.1 via the following sequence of reductions:
1. In Section 5.1 we show how to get a better handle on the output distribution of the Gnb
| speci¯cally, we apply a generic transformation on Gnb, to get a generator for which the
(conditional) pseudoentropy of each of its output blocks is the same (i.e., (n + ¢)=m).
2. In Section 5.2 we consider a direct product of the latter next-block pseudoentropy generator,
and show that this action both increases the absolute gap between the next-block pseudoen-
tropy of the generator and its real entropy (i.e., its input length), and transforms its next-block
pseudoentropy into next-block pseudo-min-entropy.
183. In Section 5.3 we show to extract pseudorandomness from the output of the latter type of
generators.
4. In Section 5.4, we put the above parts together to prove Theorem 5.1.
To simplify notations, we prove the ¯rst three steps with respect to arbitrary next-block pseu-
doentropy distributions. Given a distribution X over Um, a set of distributions Y = fYigi2[m] over
U, and an oracle-aided algorithm D(¢), we let ±D
X;Y := E
i
R Ã[m(n)]
£
±D
X;Y;i := Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi) =
1] ¡ Pr[DOX;Y (X1;:::;Xi¡1;Yi) = 1]
¤
, where OX;Y (i) samples according to the joint distribution
(X;Yi) (see De¯nition 3.1). Finally, in all of the following claims we assume the description of the
\universe" U is polynomial in n.
5.1 Entropy Equalization
In this section we show to manipulate a given distribution to gain a better characterization of its
next-block pseudoentropy, without losing \too much" pseudoentropy. The following transformation
is closely related to a similar reduction from [9]. The idea is the following: consider an m-block
random variable X over Um with next-block pseudoentropy k. Now generate m ¢ ` blocks by
concatenating ` independent copies one after the other. Finally, for a random j 2 [m], erase the
¯rst j blocks and the last m ¡ j blocks. We now have a new variable e X with m ¢ (` ¡ 1) blocks
and for every location i the block in the ith location of e X is a block of X in a random location. It
is not hard to prove (as we do below) that the next-block pseudoentropy of each block is at least
k=m. On the other hand, the real entropy of e X is at most ` times that of X. Taking large enough
` we get that the (relative) di®erence between next-block pseudoentropy and real entropy has not
signi¯cantly decreased.
For j 2 [m] and z(1);:::;z(`) 2 Um, we let Eq(j;z(1);:::;z(`)) :=
(z
(1)
j ;:::;z
(1)
m ;:::;z
(`)
1 ;:::;z
(`)
j¡1).
Lemma 5.2. Let n be a security parameter, and let m = m(n) = poly(n) and ` = `(n) = poly(n)
be poly(n)-time computable integer functions, where `(n) > 1. Let X be random variable over Um
with (T;")-next-block pseudoentropy at least k, for T = T(n), " = "(n) and k = k(n). Let J be
uniformly distributed over [m] and let e X = Eq(J;X(1);:::;X(`)), where the X(i)'s are iid copies of
X. Then every block of e X has (T ¡ O(` ¢ m ¢ logjUj);` ¢ ") next-block pseudoentropy at least k=m.
Moreover, the reduction between the security of e X and X is fully black-box.
Proof. Let m0 = (`¡1)¢m and let Y = fY1;:::;Ymg be a set of random variable jointly distributed
with X. In the following we think of Y as a single random variable Y = (Y1;:::;Ym) jointly
distributed with X, though we only sample a single entry Yi per instance of Y . Let Y (1);:::;Y (`)
be iid copies of Y and let e Y = Eq(J;Y (1);:::;Y (`)) be jointly distributed with e X in the natural
way |- J takes the same value as in e X, and for every j 2 [`], Y (j) is jointly distributed with
X(j) according to the joint distribution (X;Y ). Notice that e Yi = YJ+i¡1 mod m (where we de¯ne
m mod m to equal m rather than 0), and that J + i ¡ 1 is uniformly distributed in [m].
Thus, for every i 2 [m0] we have that
H(e Yi j e X1;:::;i¡1) (4)
¸ H(YJ+i¡1 mod mjX1;:::;X(J+i¡1 mod m)¡1)
= E
i0 R Ã[m]
[H(Yi0 j X1;:::;Xi0¡1)]:
19Let e D be an adversary the violates the next-block pseudoentropy of e X. We de¯ne D for breaking
the next-block pseudoentropy of X as follows: on input (x1;:::;xi¡1;z), D generates a random
sample x0 = (x0
1;:::;x0
m0) from e X (using OX;Y ). It then selects i0 2 [m0] uniformly at random
such that i0 = j + i ¡ 1 mod m, where j is the value of J in the generation of x0, and returns
e D
O e X;e Y (x0
1;:::;x0
i0¡i;x1;:::;xi¡1;z), while answering e D's queries to O e X;e Y using OX;Y .
We note that D makes at most ` times more oracle queries than e D, and that D can be imple-
mented in the running time of e D plus O(` ¢ m ¢ logjUj).
For every Y as above with
P
i2[m] H(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ k, Equation (4) yields that e Y is a random
variable that e D should be able to next-block distinguish from e X. Since the query to e D done by D
is distributed identically to a random challenge to e D with respect to the joint distribution ( e X; e Y ),
it follows that
±
e D
e X;e Y = ±D
X;Y · L ¢ " = e L ¢ (`");
where L and e L are the number of oracle calls made by D and e D, respectively.This is contradiction
to the assumption about the next-block pseudoentropy of X. ¤
5.2 Next-block Pseudoentropy Converts to Pseudo-Min-Entropy
In this section we show how to transform next-block (Shannon) pseudoentropy to next-block pseudo-
min-entropy, while increasing the overall entropy gap. The transformation of X is simply a t-
fold parallel repetition of X (i.e., every block of the new random variable Xt is composed of t
corresponding blocks of t independent copies of X). This generalizes an analogous transformation
that was used by Hº astad et al. [14] in the context of standard (i.e. single-block) pseudoentropy.
Given an m-block random variable V taking values in Um and an integer t > 0, we let V t =
((V
(1)
1 ;:::;V
(t)
1 );:::;(V
(1)
m ;:::;V
(t)
m )) 2 (Ut)m, where the V (i)'s are iid copies of V .
Lemma 5.3. Let n be a security parameter, and m = m(n) = poly(n), t = t(n) = poly(n), be
poly(n)-time computable functions, and let X be a random variable over Um where every block of
X has (T;") next-block pseudoentropy at least ®, for T = T(n), " = "(n), ® = ®(n). Then for
every · = ·(n) > 0 it holds that every block of Xt has (T0;"0) next-block pseudo-min-entropy ®0,
where
² T0 = T0(n) = T ¡ O(m ¢ t ¢ logjUj).
² "0 = "0(n) = t2 ¢ (" + 2¡· + 2¡c¢t) for a universal constant c > 0, and
² ®0 = ®0(n) = t ¢ ® ¡ ¡(t;·;jUj), for ¡(t;·;jUj) 2 O(
p
t ¢ · ¢ log(jUj ¢ t)).
Furthermore, the reduction between the security of Xt and X is fully black-box.
Notice that the t¢® term is the largest we could hope for the pseudoentropy | getting ® bits of
pseudoentropy per copy. However, since we wish to move from a pseudo-form of Shannon entropy
(measuring randomness on average) to a pseudo-form of min-entropy (measuring randomness with
high probability), we may have a deviation that grows like
p
t. By taking t large enough, this
deviation becomes insigni¯cant.
In more detail, consider the case that X has next-block pseudoentropy at least ® with polynomial
security, i.e. T and 1=" can be taken to be arbitrarily large polynomials in n, and we would like to
deduce that Xt has next-block pseudo-min-entropy ®0 with polynomial security. Moreover, assume
20U = f0;1g. Then we should take · and t to be an arbitrarily large multiples of logn, and we have
®0 = t¢(®¡O(
p
(logn)=t)¢logt): So if we would like to have pseudo-min-entropy at least t¢(®¡±),
we should take t to be polylog(n)=±2. In our application, we have ± = £(¢=n) = £(logn=n), so
we take t = ~ O(n2) copies.
Proof. For a random variables Yi over U jointly distributed with X, we de¯ned the, jointly dis-
tributed with Xt, variable (Yi)t = ((Yi)(1);:::;(Yi)(t)), where for each j 2 [t] the entry (Yi)(j) is
jointly distributed with the entry X(j) in Xt according to the joint distribution (X;Yi). Given an
adversary Dt that violates the next-block pseudo-min-entropy of Xt, we de¯ne D for breaking the
next-block pseudoentropy of X as follows: given an input (x1;:::;xi¡1;z) and oracle access to OX;Y ,
D ¯rst samples j
R Ã [t] and (xt;yt) from (Xt;(Yi)t) (using OX;Y ). Then it replaces (xt
j;1 :::;xt
j;i¡1)
(the (i¡1) pre¯x of j'th column of xt) with (x1;:::;xi¡1), sets z[j] = (xt
i;1;:::;xt
i;j¡1;z;yt
j+1;:::;yt
t),
and returns D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (xt
1;:::;i¡1;z[j]), while answering Dt's queries to OXt;(Yi)t using OX;Y . That is,
D queries Dt on the j'th hybrid between (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;(Yi)t) and Xt
1;:::;i.
We note that D makes at most t times more oracle calls than Dt, and that it can be implemented
in the same time as D plus O(t ¢ m ¢ logjUj).
Assuming that H(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ® for i 2 [m], Lemma 2.1 yields that there exists a random
variable W over Ut jointly distributed with Xt, such that the following hold:
1. ¢((Xt
1;:::;i¡1;(Yi)t);(Xt
1;:::;i¡1;W)) · 2¡· + 2¡c¢t for a universal constant c > 0, and
2. H1(W j x1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ® ¡ ¡(t;·;jUj) for every x 2 Supp(Xt).
For j 2 [t], let Z[j] = ((Xt
i)1;:::;j;(Yi)t
j+1;:::;t) (i.e., the j'th hybrid between Xt
i and (Yi)t). It follows
that for each i 2 [m], we have
±D
X;Y;i
:=
1
t
¢
X
j2[t]
¡
Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Z[j]) = 1] ¡ Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Z[j¡1]) = 1]
¢
=
1
t
¢
¡
Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Z[t]) = 1] ¡ Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Z[0]) = 1]
¢
=
1
t
¢
¡
Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Xt
i) = 1] ¡ Pr[D
OXt;(Yi)t
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;(Yi)t) = 1]
¢
¸
1
t
¢
¡
Pr[D
OXt;W
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;Xt
i) = 1] ¡ Pr[D
OXt;W
t (Xt
1;:::;i¡1;W) = 1] ¡ L0 ¢ (2¡· ¡ 2¡c¢t)
¢
=:
1
t
¢
¡
±Dt
Xt;W;i ¡ L0 ¢ (2¡· ¡ 2¡c¢t)
¢
;
where L0 is a bound on the number of oracles calls made by Dt. Taking expectations over i
R Ã[m],
we have
±D
X;Y ¸
1
t
¢
³
±Dt
Xt;W ¡ L0 ¢ (2¡· + 2¡c¢t)
´
¸
1
t
¢
¡
t2 ¢ L0 ¢ (" + 2¡· + 2¡c¢t) ¡ L0 ¢ (2¡· + 2¡c¢t)
¢
¸ L0 ¢ t ¢ " = L";
21where L = t ¢ L0 is a bound on the number of oracle calls made by D. Since this holds for all fYig
such that H(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ®, this contradicts the assumption about the next-block pseudoentropy
of X. ¤
5.3 Next-block Pseudo-Min-Entropy to Pseudorandomness
For our ¯nal step, we assume that X is such that each of the m blocks of X has large next-block
pseudo-min-entropy ®. Using a two-universal independent hash function S, we extract almost all
its pseudo-min-entropy of each block individually. The result is a su±ciently long pseudorandom
bit sequence. This is a computational analogue of block-source extraction in the literature on
randomness extractors [2, 29].
Lemma 5.4. Let n be a security parameter, m = m(n) = poly(n), t = t(n) = poly(n), ® =
®(n) 2 [t(n)] and · = ·(n) 2 [®(n)] be poly(n)-time computable integer functions. There exists
an e±cient procedure Ext 2 NC1 that on input x 2 (f0;1gt)m and s 2 f0;1gt, outputs a string
y 2 f0;1gt+m¢(®¡·) such that the following holds.
Let X be a random variable over (f0;1gt)m such that every block of X has (T;") next-block
pseudo-min-entropy ®, for T = T(n) and " = "(n), then Ext(X;Ut) is (T ¡m¢tO(1);m¢("+2¡·=2))
pseudorandom. Moreover, the reduction between the pseudorandomness of Ext(X;Ut) and the
security X is fully black-box.
Proof. Let Ext(x;s) := (s;s(x1);:::;s(xm)), where s is interpreted as a member of a family of
two-universal hash functions from t bits to ® ¡ · bits in NC1 (such as s(x) := s ¢ x over GF(2t)
truncated to ® ¡ · bits). Let DPRG be an adversary for the pseudorandomness of Ext(X;Ut), and
let ±PRG be its distinguishing advantage. We de¯ne D for breaking the next-block pseudoentropy of
X as follows: on input (x1;:::;xi¡1;z), D returns DPRG(s;s(x1);:::;s(xi¡1);s(z);U(®¡·)¢(m¡i)),
where s is uniformly chosen from f0;1gt.
We note that D makes no oracle calls (and thus we count its query complexity as one), and
that its running-time is at most that of DPRG plus m ¢ poly(t).
Let Z[i](W) := (S;S(X1);:::;S(Xi¡1);S(W);U(®¡·)¢(m¡i)), for a uniformly distributed hash
function S. Let Y = fY1;:::;Ymg be a set of random variable over U jointly distributed with
X, with H1(Yi j X1;:::;i¡1 = x1;:::;i¡1) ¸ ® for every x 2 Supp(X) and i 2 [m]. The Leftover
Hash Lemma [20, 19] yields that Z[i](Yi) has statistical di®erence at most 2¡·=2 from Z[i¡1](Xi¡1).
Thus
±PRG = Pr[DPRG(Z[m](Xm)) = 1] ¡ Pr[DPRG(Z[0](X0)) = 1]
=
m X
i=1
³
Pr[DPRG(Z[i](Xi)) = 1] ¡ Pr[DPRG(Z[i¡1](Xi¡1)) = 1]
´
·
m X
i=1
³
Pr[DPRG(Z[i](Xi)) = 1] ¡ Pr[DPRG(Z[i](Yi)) = 1] + 2¡·=2
´
= m ¢ (±D
X;Y + 2¡·=2)
· m ¢ (" + 2¡·=2):
¤
225.4 Putting It Together
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.5 (Theorem 5.1, restated). Let n be a security parameter, and let m = m(n),
¢ = ¢(n) 2 [1=poly(n);n], and · = ·(n) 2 f1;:::;ng be poly(n)-time computable. For every
polynomial-time computable, m-block generator Gnb: f0;1gn 7! f0;1gm, there exists a polynomial-
time computable generator G : f0;1gd ! f0;1gd¢(1+­(¢=n)) with seed length
d = d(n) = O
µ
n2 ¢ m2 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
¢3
¶
such that the following holds:
Security: If Gnb has (T;")-next-block pseudoentropy at least n + ¢, for T = T(n);" = "(n), then
G is a (T ¡nO(1);nO(1) ¢("+2¡·))-pseudorandom generator. Moreover, the reduction is fully
black-box.
Complexity: G is computable in NC1 with O(d=n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to Gnb.
Proof. Let X = Gnb(Un). Without loss of generality, we may assume that the number m of output
blocks (=bits) of Gnb is a power of 2 (by padding with zeroes if necessary). X can be generated
using n random bits, and has next-block pseudoentropy k = n + ¢.
We now set ` = d2(n+¢+logm)=¢e = O(n=¢) and apply Entropy Equalization (Lemma 5.2)
to obtain e X := Eq(J;X(1);:::;X(`)), where J is uniformly distributed over [m] and the X(i)'s are
iid copies of X. e X can be generated using d` = logm+ `¢n random bits, and has m0 = (`¡ 1)¢ m
blocks. Every block of e X has (T` = T ¡ O(` ¢ m);"` = ` ¢ ")-next-block pseudoentropy at least
®` = k=m. Thus the total next-block pseudoentropy in e X is at least
m0 ¢ ®` = m ¢ (` ¡ 1) ¢ k=m
= (n + ¢) ¢ (` ¡ 1)
¸ n ¢ ` + logm + ¢`=2
= d` + ¢`=2;
where the inequality follows from the setting of `.
Next we apply t-fold parallel repetition (Lemma 5.3) to obtain ( e X)t, for a parameter t = poly(n)
to be set below. ( e X)t can be generated using dt = t ¢ d` random bits and has m0 blocks of t bits
each. Every block of ( e X)t has (Tt = T` ¡O(m0 ¢t);"t = t2 ¢("` +2¡· +2¡­(t)))-next-block pseudo-
min-entropy ®t = t ¢ ®` ¡ ¡(t;·).
Finally, we apply Lemma 5.4, extracting ®t ¡ 2· bits from each block of ( e X)t using a seed of
length t. This yields our ¯nal output Ext(( e X)t;Ut), which is (T0;"0) pseudorandom, for
T0 = Tt ¡ m0 ¢ tO(1) = T ¡ poly(n)
"0 = m0 ¢ ("t + 2¡·) = poly(n) ¢ (" + 2¡· + 2¡­(t)):
Ext(( e X)t;Ut) can be generated using a seed of length
d = dt + t = t ¢ d` + t = O(t ¢ ` ¢ n);
23and has an output length of
d0 = m0 ¢ (®t ¡ ·) + t
= m0 ¢ (t ¢ ®` ¡ ¡(t;·) ¡ ·) + t
¸ t ¢ d` + t¢`=2 ¡ m0 ¢ (¡(t;·) + ·) + t
= d + t¢`=2 ¡ m0 ¢ O(
p
t· ¢ logt + ·)
¸ d + t¢`=4 = (1 + ­(¢=n)) ¢ d;
where the last inequality follows from an appropriate setting of
t = O
Ãµ
m0
¢`
¶2
¢ · ¢ log2
µ
m0·
¢`
¶!
= O
µ
m2 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
¢2
¶
:
Finally, we can bound the seed length d by
d = O(t ¢ n ¢ `) = O
µ
n2 ¢ m2 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
¢3
¶
:
¤
6 Deducing the Main Results
We are now ready to prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 6.1 (Pseudorandom generators from one-way functions). Let n be a security parameter
and f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn a polynomial-time computable function. For all poly(n)-time computable
functions " = "(n) · 1=nc (where c is a universal constant) and · = ·(n) 2 [n=4], there exists an
e±cient generator G from strings of length d = d(n) = O(n4 ¢ · ¢ log2 n=log3(1=")) to strings of
length d ¢ (1 + ­(log(1="))=n), such that the following holds:
Security: Assume that f is a (T;") one-way function for T = T(n). Then for every poly(n)-
time computable function "0 = "0(n) ¸ 2¡·, G is a (T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0 ¢ nO(1))-pseudorandom
generator. Moreover, the reduction is fully black-box,
Complexity: G is computable in NC1 with O(d=n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to f.
Proof. We let c be the constant of Theorem 4.9. We start by applying Theorem 4.9 on f, to
get a generator Gnb: f0;1gd1 7! f0;1gm1 that has (T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0)-next-block-pseudoentropy
k = d1 + log(1=")=2, where d1;m1 2 O(n).
In the next step we apply Theorem 5.1 with respect to the above Gnb, · and ¢ := log(1=")=2,
to get an e±cient generator from strings of length
d = O
µ
d2
1 ¢ m2
1 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
¢3
¶
= O
µ
n4 ¢ · ¢ log2 n
log3(1=")
¶
to strings of length d ¢ (1 + ­(log(1="))=n), that is (T ¢ ("0=n)O(1) ¡ nO(1);("1 + 2¡·) ¢ nO(1)) =
(T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0 ¢ nO(1))-pseudorandom. ¤
24The above theorem yields the following important corollaries.
Corollary 6.2 (Pseudorandom generator from one-way functions | polynomial security case).
Let n be a security parameter and f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn a one-way function.Then there exists a
pseudorandom generator G from strings of length d = d(n) 2 ~ O(n4) to strings of length d ¢ (1 +
­((logn)=n)).
Furthermore, the reduction is fully black-box. G is computable in NC1 with O(d=n) (uniformly
random) oracle calls to f.
Proof. Applying Theorem 6.1 on f, " = 1=nc and · = log2 n, we get an e±cient generator G
of the stated input and output lengths. Assume now that G is not a pseudorandom generater.
Namely, there exists p 2 poly such that G is not (p(n);1=p(n)) pseudorandom. Therefore, G is not
(T ¢ ("0=n)O(1);"0 ¢ poly(n))-pseudorandom, for "0 := 1=p(n) ¢ poly(n) > 2¡· and T = poly(n) ¢ p(n).
It follows that f is not (T;")-one-way, in contradiction. ¤
Corollary 6.3 (Pseudorandom generator from one-way functions |exponential hardness case).
Let f : f0;1gn 7! f0;1gn be a (2­(n);2¡­(n))-one-way function. Then
1. There exists a (2­(n);2¡­(log2 n))-pseudorandom generator G from strings of length d = d(n) 2
~ O(n) to strings of length d ¢ (1 + ­(1)), and
2. There exists a (2­(n);2¡­(n))-pseudorandom generator G from strings of length d = d(n) 2
~ O(n2) to strings of length d ¢ (1 + ­(1)),
Furthermore, in both cases it holds that the reduction is fully black-box, G is computable in NC1
with O(d=n) (uniformly random) oracle calls to f.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 6.1, taking · = log2(n) and · 2 ­(n) in the ¯rst and second cases
respectively, and "0 = 2¡·. ¤
Acknowledgments
We thank Benny Applebaum, Oded Goldreich, Thomas Holenstein, and Emanuele Viola for very
helpful conversations.
References
[1] B. Applebaum, Y. Ishai, and E. Kushilevitz. Cryptography in NC0. SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, 36, 2006.
[2] B. Chor and O. Goldreich. Unbiased bits from sources of weak randomness and probabilistic
communication complexity. SIAM J. Comput., 17(2):230{261, Apr. 1988.
[3] U. Feige, A. Fiat, and A. Shamir. Zero-knowledge proofs of identity. Journal of Cryptology, 1
(2):77{94, 1988.
[4] O. Goldreich and L. A. Levin. A hard-core predicate for all one-way functions. In Proceedings
of the 21st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 25{32, 1989.
25[5] O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali. How to construct random functions. Journal of
the ACM, 33(4):792{807, 1986.
[6] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. Proofs that yield nothing but their validity or
all languages in NP have zero-knowledge proof systems. Journal of the ACM, 38(1):691{729,
1991.
[7] O. Goldreich, H. Krawczyk, and M. Luby. On the existence of pseudorandom generators.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 22(6):1163{1175, 1993.
[8] V. Guruswami and M. Sudan. List decoding algorithms for certain concatenated codes. In
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
181{190 (electronic), New York, 2000. ACM. doi: 10.1145/335305.335327. URL http://dx.
doi.org/10.1145/335305.335327.
[9] I. Haitner, O. Reingold, S. Vadhan, and H. Wee. Inaccessible entropy. In Proceedings of the
41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC).
[10] I. Haitner, D. Harnik, and O. Reingold. On the power of the randomized iterate. In Advances
in Cryptology { CRYPTO 2006, 2006.
[11] I. Haitner, D. Harnik, and O. Reingold. E±cient pseudorandom generators from exponen-
tially hard one-way functions. In Automata, Languages and Programming, 24th International
Colloquium, ICALP, 2006.
[12] I. Haitner, M. Nguyen, S. J. Ong, O. Reingold, and S. Vadhan. Statistically hiding commit-
ments and statistical zero-knowledge arguments from any one-way function. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 39(3):1153{1218, 2009.
[13] I. Haitner, O. Reingold, S. Vadhan, and H. Wee. Inaccessible entropy. In Proceedings of the
41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC `09), pages 611{620, 31 May{2
June 2009.
[14] J. Hº astad, R. Impagliazzo, L. A. Levin, and M. Luby. A pseudorandom generator from any
one-way function. SIAM Journal on Computing, 28(4):1364{1396, 1999.
[15] T. Holenstein. Key agreement from weak bit agreement. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 664{673, 2005.
[16] T. Holenstein. Pseudorandom generators from one-way functions: A simple construction for
any hardness. In Theory of Cryptography, Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC
2006, 2006.
[17] T. Holenstein. Strengthening key agreement using hard-core sets - PhD thesis, 2006.
[18] R. Impagliazzo. A personal view of average-case complexity. In Proceedings of the Tenth
Annual Structure in Complexity Theory Conference, pages 134{147. IEEE Computer Society,
1995.
[19] R. Impagliazzo and D. Zuckerman. How to recycle random bits. In Proceedings of the 30th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 248{253, 1989.
26[20] R. Impagliazzo, L. A. Levin, and M. Luby. Pseudo-random generation from one-way functions.
In Proceedings of the 21st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages
12{24. ACM Press, 1989.
[21] M. Luby and C. Racko®. How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom
functions. SIAM Journal on Computing, 17(2):373{386, 1988.
[22] M. Naor. Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. Journal of Cryptology, 4(2):151{158,
1991.
[23] A. A. Razborov and S. Rudich. Natural proofs. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 55
(1):24{35, Aug. 1997.
[24] O. Reingold, L. Trevisan, and S. P. Vadhan. Notions of reducibility between cryptographic
primitives. In Theory of Cryptography, First Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2004,
pages 1{20.
[25] M. Sudan, L. Trevisan, and S. Vadhan. Pseudorandom generators without the XOR lemma.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 62:236{266, 2001.
[26] S. P. Vadhan. Constructing locally computable extractors and cryptosystems in the bounded-
storage model. Journal of Cryptology, 17(1):43{77, January 2004.
[27] L. G. Valiant. A theory of the learnable. Communications of the ACM, 27(11):1134{1142,
1984.
[28] A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. pages 160{164, 1982.
[29] D. Zuckerman. Simulating BPP using a general weak random source. Algorithmica, 16(4/5):
367{391, Oct./Nov. 1996.
A The Uniform Hardcore Lemma
In this section, we show how to deduce our version of the Uniform Hardcore Lemma (Proposi-
tion 4.7) from what Holenstein proves. Holenstein's statement of the Hardcore Lemma requires the
functions °(n) and ±(n) to be computable in time poly(n) and to be at least 1=poly(n). However,
the same proof yields the following, where we give ± and ° as input to the algorithm M, and we
allow a loss of (±°)O(1) in the running time:
Proposition A.1 ([17], Thm 6.8). Let n be a security parameter, and let h: f0;1gn 7! f0;1g`(n)
and V : f0;1gn 7! f0;1g be polynomial-time computable functions. Let ± = ±(n) 2 [±0;1], and
° = °(n) 2 [0;1] > 2¡n=3. Assume that
Pr[M(±;°;h(Un)) = V (Un)] · 1 ¡ ±=2 + °2±5=8192
for every probabilistic algorithm M running in time T = T(n) and large enough n. Then for every
oracle-aided predictor P running in time T ¢ (°±=n)O(1) and all su±ciently large n, there exists a
set L µ f0;1gn of density at least ± such that
Pr
W
R ÃL
[PÂL(h(W)) = V (W)] < (1 + °)=2;
27where ÂL is the characteristic function of L, provided that all the queries of P to ÂL are computed
independently of the input h(W). Furthermore, the reduction is fully black-box.
Note the hypothesis of Holenstein's lemma is slightly stronger in that it works even if the success
probability of M is slightly higher than 1 ¡ ±=2; this slackness will be convenient in deducing
Proposition 4.7, which we now do.
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Assume that
Pr[M(±0;°;h(Un)) = V (Un)] · 1 ¡ ±=2 (5)
for every probabilistic algorithm M running in time T = T(n) and large enough n. Then we will
argue that
Pr[M0(±0;°;h(Un)) = V (Un)) · 1 ¡ ±0=2 + ®; (6)
for every probabilistic algorithm M0 running in time T0 = T(n) ¢ (±0°)O(1) and large enough n,
where ±0 is the smallest multiple of ® = ±5
0°2=8192 that is at least as large as ± (so ±0 · ± + ®).
Suppose for contradiction that there is an M0 violating Inequality (6). Then we can obtain an
M violating Inequality (5) by trying ±0 = i ¢ ® for each i = 0;:::;b1=®c, estimating the success
probability to within accuracy ®=3 (by random sampling), and ¯nally running M0 with the value
of ±0 that achieves maximum estimated success probability.
Since ® · (±0)5°2=8192, we can apply Proposition A.1 to obtain, for every predictor P running
in time T0 ¢ (°±0=n)O(1) = T ¢ (°±0=n)O(1), a hardcore set L of density ±0 ¸ ±. ¤
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